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STATE V. BROSSART: ADAPTING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT FOR A FUTURE WITH DRONES 
By: Thomas A. Bryan+ 
Imagine a situation in which law enforcement officials unexpectedly confront 
a father and son.1  The confrontation quickly escalates into an armed struggle 
leading to the father’s arrest and the detainment of his adult son.2  After the 
father’s arrest, police go to the family’s home and request admittance to the 
defendant’s properties.3  The three adult sons present in the home deny the 
request.4  Without consent and unbeknownst to the family inside, the authorities 
then launch an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to survey the father’s properties 
in an effort to gather information.5  The intelligence gathered by this drone is 
later used to arrest and prosecute five family members.6 
The facts above do not refer to an anti-terrorism-related arrest in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan or Yemen.7  Rather, they refer to events that took place in rural North 
 + J.D. and Master’s Degree in International Politics, May 2014, The Catholic University of 
America, Columbus School of Law; B.A. 2008, Haverford College. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Mary Leary for her guidance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; John Laufer, for his 
research assistance; and the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their editorial work 
and feedback. The author also wishes to thank Celine Tobal for years of inspiration and editorial 
support, as well as his family, particularly Wandy, Andy, and Patricia, for their love and life-long 
encouragement. 
 1. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-0049, Slip Op. at 3 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012) 
(discussing the initial confrontation between Rodney Brossart and the police that led to the suit). 
 2. Id. at 4. 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 6. 
 6. Id. at 1–2; Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American 
Citizen, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen. 
 7. Drones have gained public notoriety for their controversial role in the United States’ War 
on Terror.  See Death From Afar: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3–9, 2012, at 61, 
61 (reporting that U.S. drones have been used for targeted killings in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia as part of the war on terrorism).  The U.S. Department of Defense defines the War on 
Terror as military operations to combat terrorism launched following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.  See INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. D-2009-073, DOD 
COMPONENTS’ USE OF GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING PROVIDED FOR 
PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy09/09-073.pdf.   In addition to the War on Terror, the United 
States has also used UAVs in a number of military conflicts and humanitarian efforts, such as those 
in Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti, and Libya.  See JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, 
U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, at Summary (2012), available at http://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf; Greg Miller, CIA Rushed to Rescue Envoys in Libya Siege, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 2, 2012, at A1. 
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Dakota and form the basis for the prosecution of Rodney Brossart and his four 
children in State v. Brossart.8  As one of the first cases involving the use of a 
UAV, or drone,9 to monitor civilians in the United States, the Brossart case has 
received wide media attention and has led to much speculation as to its Fourth 
Amendment implications.10 
Tracing its roots to the Founding Fathers’ desire “that our society should be 
one in which citizens ‘dwell in reasonable security and freedom from 
surveillance,’”11 Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence has developed in a 
complicated, and sometimes conflicting, manner.12  Initially, Fourth 
Amendment search analysis was almost exclusively concerned with the 
government’s violation of a person’s property interests.13  However, in the 1960s 
this method of analysis transformed in response to technological changes 
enabling the government to obtain information about the interior of a home 
without physically entering it.14  The contours of search analysis were redefined 
again in 2012 in response to the emergence of GPS technology, which enables 
law enforcement the ability to conduct long-term surveillance of a person.15  
 8. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049 at 3–6. 
 9. An UAV, commonly known as a drone, is any aircraft capable of sustained flight that is 
guided “without an onboard crew.” Introduction of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), DEP’T 
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/specials/uav2002/(last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also The  
UAV-The Future of the Sky, THEUAV.COM, http://www.theuav.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) 
(equating drones with UAVS). 
 10. See, e.g., Koebler, supra note 6; Jason Koebler, First Man Arrested with Drone Evidence 
Vows to Fight Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2012/04/09/first-man-arrested-with-drone-evidence-vows 
-to-fight-case; Domestic drone justice: US court greenlights Police UAV use, RUSSIA TODAY (Aug. 
3, 2012, 4:51 AM), http://rt.com/usa/domestic-drone-court-ruling-743. 
 11. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 12. According to many scholars, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is among the most 
confusing areas of U.S. law.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions related to the 
Fourth Amendment are embarrassing, have been contradictory, and result in odd rules); Ronald J. 
Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus 
General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998) (noting that Fourth 
Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court “lack[] coherence and predictability); Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Orin S. Kerr, 
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) 
(explaining how “judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment are infamous for their 
byzantine patchwork of protections”). 
 13. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION, § 6.02, at 68–70 (5th ed. 2010) (laying out the pre-Katz trespass 
doctrine). 
 14. See id. § 6.03, at 71. 
 15. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the installation of a 
GPS tracking device on a defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent monitoring of the defendant’s 
movements violated the Fourth Amendment) mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Even though the Court has issued some seemingly contradictory decisions 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, it has consistently sought to maintain that 
“the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion” embodies the “very core” of the Fourth 
Amendment.16 
The imminent introduction of UAV technology into everyday civilian life in 
the United States will change citizen interaction with law enforcement and 
potentially lead to further development in Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence.17  Rodney Brossart’s challenge to the local sheriff’s use of UAV 
technology in North Dakota has become a symbol to those who fear an erosion 
of Fourth Amendment protections.18  This fear has become particularly 
heightened after the trial court denied Brossart’s motion to dismiss the criminal 
charges or suppress the drone-acquired evidence in his case.19 
This Comment analyzes the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that guided the 
court’s decision in State v. Brossart.  Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and introduces how the 
imminent rise in the domestic use of drones challenges this jurisprudence.20  
This Part begins by tracing the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence from the trespass doctrine to the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test set forth in Katz v. United States.21  Part I then considers changes the 
Supreme Court brought about in Fourth Amendment analysis through  United 
States v. Jones.22  Part I concludes by highlighting the emergence of the use of 
UAVs in the United States and presenting the facts of the Brossart case as a test 
 16. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 17. See Larry Abramson, Drones: From War Weapon To Homemade Toy, NPR (Aug. 2, 
2012, 4:24 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/02/157441681/drones-from-war-weapon-to-home 
made-toy (speculating that drones will become widespread in the next several years); Jason 
Koebler, The Coming Drone Revolution: What You Should Know, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 
5, 2012) http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/05/the-coming-drone-revolution-what 
-you-should-know (highlighting the privacy concerns that the widespread use of drones will incite). 
 18. See S.H. Blannelberry, Drone-Aided Arrest Raises Questions About 4th Amendment, 
GUNS.COM (June 9, 2012), http://www.guns.com/2012/06/09/drone-aided-arrest-4th-amendment 
(discussing how the Brossart case has brought UAV use by police to the public’s attention). 
 19. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip Op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012) 
(denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the use of a UAV); Joe Wolverton, II, The 
Fourth Amendment and the Drones: How Will It Apply?, NEW AM. (Aug. 15, 2012, 5:30 PM), 
http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/12486-the-fourth-amendment-and-drones 
-how-will-it-apply (questioning how UAV use by law enforcement will be constitutionally 
interpreted, particularly after the Brossart case). 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (supplanting the “trespass” doctrine with 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 22. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (reviving the trespass doctrine and 
holding that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle to monitor a suspect’s movements is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes a physical trespass by the government) 
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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case illustrating a scenario that will likely become more common as the use of 
UAVs increases domestically.  Part II applies existing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to the Brossart facts and demonstrates that the court correctly 
concluded that law enforcement’s use of a UAV in this case did not constitute a 
Fourth Amendment search. Part III argues that Fourth Amendment search 
jurisprudence must be strengthened through Congressional action in order to 
sufficiently protect privacy in a new age where widespread domestic UAV use 
is common. 
I.  SETTING THE SCENE: DRONES PRESENT A CHALLENGE TO CURRENT FOURTH 
AMENDMENT SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE. 
A.  From Boyd to Jones: The Development of Fourth Amendment Search 
Jurisprudence 
1.  A Historical Look at the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.23 
The meaning of, and intent behind, those fifty-four words have been debated 
by both practicing attorneys and scholars for decades, leading to a plethora of 
interpretations from the Supreme Court and lower courts alike.24  More than two 
centuries since its adoption, the Amendment’s very purpose continues to be 
debated.25  Yet, most scholars agree that the Framers of the Constitution 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 4.01, at 49–50. 
 25. See, e.g., THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 16–17 (2008) [hereinafter CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT] (discussing the 
“‘neverending’ debate” over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Thomas Clancy, What Is a 
“Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter 
Clancy, What is a “Search”?] (explaining that the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the 
Eighteenth Century was a reaction against colonial abuses); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, 
and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1525 (1996) 
(concluding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment includes not only the right of the innocent to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, but the right of all people to be treated fairly and hence 
to be searched and perhaps punished because the government knows (to some set level of certainty) 
that they deserve to be searched and punished”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 590 (1999) (stating that “the Framers adopted 
constitutional search and seizure provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of 
person and house by prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.”); Scott E. Sundby, 
“Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994) (defining the “constitutional value underlying the Fourth 
Amendment as that of ‘trust’ between the government and the citizenry”). 
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included the Fourth Amendment to protect against the extreme and 
unpredictable invasions of property that were common in colonial America.26 
Until 1967, the Supreme Court based its Fourth Amendment search analyses 
on property and trespass theories.27  The 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States 
introduced property-rights concepts into the Fourth Amendment analysis.28  
In Boyd, the prosecution sought to show that the defendants committed customs 
fraud by forcing them to present receipts showing that they had paid import 
duties for only 29 of the 35 cases of plate glass that they brought in to the 
country.29  The Court concluded that the government could not require the 
defendants to produce the receipts, reasoning that the defendants had a property 
interest in the receipts that could not be superceded without a warrant.30  Relying 
on its Boyd decision, the Supreme Court consistently declined to find a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment absent a physical trespass.31  After the Boyd test was 
 26. Clancy, What is a “Search”?, supra note 25, at 4; see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra 
note 13, § 4.03 at 52 (noting that the Fourth Amendment came about as a result of the colonists 
experience with writs of assistance and general warrants, which allowed agents to search a colonists 
home at will); Davies, supra note 25, at 561–67 (tracing the Framer’s motivation for drafting the 
Fourth Amendment to three events leading up to the American Revolution where the British used 
extreme search and seizure practices). 
 27. See CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 3.1.1, at 46 (explaining that, 
prior to the Katz decision, the Court considered Fourth Amendment questions in light of the 
property rights at stake and only allowed government intrusion without a warrant where the 
government had a superior property right); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at  
68–69 (discussing the Court’s decisions prior to Katz v. United States in 1967, where the Fourth 
Amendment was analyzed using a property rights/trespass approach). 
 28. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617–18 (1886); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, 
supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (identifying Boyd as the case that “laid the seeds of the property-right 
interpretation” in Fourth Amendment cases); Clancy, What is a “Search”?, supra note 25, at 13 
(noting that Boyd was the first case in which the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 29. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–18. 
 30. Id. at 634–35.  The Court also asserted that the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent “the 
invasion of a [man’s] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”  
Id. at 630. 
 31. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 
U.S. 139, 142 (1962)).  While Dressler and Michaels identify Boyd as the “seed” of the historical 
property rights test of the Fourth Amendment, most scholars point to Olmstead v. United States as 
the best example of the Fourth Amendment analysis under this test.  See id.; Ric Simmons, From 
Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century 
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002) (discussing the importance of Olmstead in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its application of the trespass doctrine).  In Olmstead, the 
government sought to prosecute the principal conspirator in a liquor smuggling operation during 
prohibition.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–56 (1928).  During the investigation, 
government agents wiretapped the phone lines that connected the residences of the various co 
-conspirators with their main office.  Id. at 456–57.  Information garnered through the wiretaps over 
a period of several months led to the indictment and subsequent conviction for violations of the 
National Prohibition Act.  Id. at 455, 457.  The defendant challenged the admission of evidence 
obtained from the wiretaps as a violating of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 455.  The Supreme 
Court held that, because the agents had not overheard the conversations from inside either parties’ 
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established, the Supreme Court enunciated the consequences for violating the 
Fourth Amendment, thus promulgating the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United 
States.32  In basic terms, the exclusionary rule requires that evidence derivative 
of an illegal search or seizure may not be used against a criminal defendant at 
trial.33 
2.  Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The Modern Fourth 
Amendment Test 
The 1967 decision in Katz v. United States laid out the modern test for 
analyzing searches under the Fourth Amendment.34  In Katz, the defendant 
challenged his conviction for sending gambling information over the telephone 
on the grounds that the evidence used against him had been obtained during an 
unconstitutional search.35  The evidence had been gathered without a warrant by 
FBI agents who used an electronic recording device attached to the outside of 
the public telephone booth to intercept the defendant’s calls.36  Rejecting the 
trespass doctrine, the Supreme Court explained that the “Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places,” and therefore, penetration of the physical space was 
not necessary for a violation to occur.37  The Court thus concluded that the 
government’s monitoring of the telephone booth constituted an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.38The Katz decision created an upheaval in 
home, there was no “actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making 
a seizure,” and the Fourth Amendment did not protect the defendant.  Id. at 466; see also DRESSLER 
& MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (explaining that the Court held there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation because there was no physical invasion of the defendant’s property); 
CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 3.2.2, at 53–54 (interpreting the Olmstead 
decision as reasoning that conversations generally are not protected under the Fourth Amendment 
because they were not included in the enumerated list of protected items in the Amendment’s 
language and are not tangible). 
 32. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that items seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment should not have been used at trial and should be returned to the 
defendant); CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, at 613.  In Weeks, the police, 
without a warrant, arrested the defendant , entered his home , seized a number of documents, and 
used those seized documents against him at trial, despite repeated requests by the Defendant for 
their return.  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386–88.  Addressing the defendant’s challenge to the use of the 
evidence, the Supreme Court determined that the seizure of the defendant’s documents violated the 
Fourth Amendment and, as such, prohibited their use by the prosecution at trial.  Id. at 397–98.  
The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule only to federal cases until   the Court’s decision 
in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to the states through the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 33. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 4.04[B], at 56. 
 34. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03[A], at 70. 
 35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–50 (1967). 
 36. Id. at 348.  At the time of Katz’s conviction, federal statute forbade the transmission of 
bets or wages through wire communication devices.  Id.  The defendant placed calls to Miami and 
Boston from Los Angeles.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 351–53. 
 38. Id. at 359. 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by effectively nullifying the  
property-interest-based test as the controlling factor defining a search.39 Some 
scholars have proffered that the introduction of modern technology in the 1960s, 
enabling the government to intercept calls remotely, was the key factor that 
moved the Court to abandon the trespass doctrine.40  In its place, the Court used 
a two-prong test articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion.41 The test is 
composed of a subjective prong that requires that the person “exhibited an actual 
. . . expectation of privacy” and an objective prong, which requires that this 
“expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”42 
Defendants must satisfy both prongs to prove the existence of an unreasonable 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.43  The Katz Court replaced the 
trespass doctrine with the view that a search occurs when a person has an 
expectation of privacy in an item or place that society is willing to recognize as 
objectively reasonable.44 
3.  Oliver: Distinguishing Between the Home, Curtilage, and an Open Field 
While the Katz test has been the foremost Fourth Amendment search test for 
the last four decades, Fourth Amendment analysis also takes into account the 
location where the search occurred.45 The Supreme Court’s decision in Oliver v. 
United States helps to define what is a protected area under the Fourth 
Amendment.46 
Oliver was a consolidation of two cases from Kentucky and Maine in which 
police officers searched the defendants’ lands without warrants after receiving 
 39. Simmons, supra note 31, at 1307. 
 40. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03[A], at 71.  Dressler and Michaels note 
that, in light of the changes in technology, Justice Harlan believed that the trespass analysis now 
“constituted ‘bad physics as well as bad law.’”  Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
 41. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 
supra note 25, at 47, 59–60 (explaining that Justice Harlan’s opinion contains the language of the 
modern test and that the test is composed of two-prongs, one is objective and the other is 
subjective). 
 42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 43. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13 § 6.03[C], at 72 (stating that there is no search 
if either prong of the test is lacking). 
 44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 45. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that, while the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, the decision of exactly how much protection the Fourth Amendment 
provides to a person must be decided with “reference to a ‘place’”); see also Simmons, supra note 
31, at 1311–12 (noting that “Harlan’s standard-setting concurrence implies that Katz was not really 
about rejecting the ‘place-based’ analysis” but takes into account the location of information sought 
to be protected). 
 46. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 84–86 (discussing Oliver at the “open 
fields” doctrine). 
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anonymous tips that marijuana was being grown there.47  Both defendants 
moved to suppress the evidence taken from these forays onto their properties by 
law enforcement and argued that the warrantless searches were unreasonable 
and conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.48 
The Supreme Court held that the entries onto the defendants’ properties did 
not constitute Fourth Amendment searches.49  The Court reasoned that no search 
occurred because, although the Fourth Amendment provides special protection 
to the home, such protection does not extend to activities conducted in open 
fields unless they are in the immediate adjacency of the home.50  Oliver 
identified three categories of places for Fourth Amendment purposes: (1) the 
home, where Fourth Amendment protections are at their maximum;  
(2) the curtilage, or “land immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home,”51 which receives limited protection; and (3) open fields, which do not 
receive any Fourth Amendment protection.52  In light of Oliver, the analysis of 
 47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173–75 (1984).  In the first of the two consolidated 
cases, two plain-clothed police officers entered the defendant’s 200 acre farm in rural Kentucky 
through a private road that was marked with various “No Trespassing” signs while driving an 
unmarked police vehicle.  United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  Once inside the defendant’s property, the officers drove 
past the defendant’s home and drove a significant distance onto the property before encountering a 
locked gate and  “No Trespassing” signs on the fences on either side of the gate.  Id. at 362.  The 
officers parked their vehicle and followed a path through a gap in the fence that led them to a 
camper that was used as a “home” and a barn.  Id.  The officers then encountered an unknown 
person who warned them that hunting was not allowed on the property, but they continued on until 
they found an isolated marijuana field more than one and four-tenths of a mile from the defendant’s 
home but still on his property, “bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments,” and 
virtually invisible from all publicly accessible land.  Id. at 362–63.  In the second case, two police 
officers entered the defendant’s property, which was completely surrounded by various fences and 
“No Trespassing” signs.  State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 491 (Me. 1982) rev’d sub nom. Oliver, 
466 U.S. 170.  The officers followed a path across the defendant’s property through a wooded area 
until reaching two clearings where marijuana was being grown, both of which were nearly 
impossible to see unless one was purposely looking for them.  Id. 
 48. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–75. 
 49. Id. at 181. 
 50. Id. at 178.  The Court specifically explained that there is no legitimate expectation of 
privacy for outdoor activities taking place in fields unless other criteria are met, i.e., proximity to 
the home.  Id. 
 51. Id. at 180.  In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court identified four factors for 
determining whether an area is curtilage: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the 
home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation.”  United States v. Dunn, 180 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987); see also Joseph J. Vacek, Big 
Brother Will Soon be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory and Operational Issues 
Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 680 
(2009) (noting that “curtilage is a legal ‘penumbra’”). 
 52. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.06[B], at 85–86.  The open fields doctrine 
did not originate in Oliver, but rather in Hester v. United States.  CLANCY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 4.4.1.1, at 123.  The Court’s decision in Katz called into question 
the continued validity of the “open fields” doctrine with its focus on the privacy interest of the 
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whether aerial surveillance conducted by UAV constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search thus requires attention to the location observed.53 
4.  Knotts, Karo and Kyllo: Balancing The Fourth Amendment’s Strong 
Protections of the Home with New Technologies 
The emergence of technology enabling the government to obtain information 
about an enclosed area without physically entering the area prompted the 
Supreme Court to abandon its Fourth Amendment property-rights analysis and 
adopt the Katz test.54  However, this test has not fully resolved the optimal 
balance between the Fourth Amendment protections of the home and the 
government’s use of ever-evolving technologies.55  The following cases 
illustrate the Court’s struggle with applying the Fourth Amendment in the face 
of technological innovation. 
In United States v. Knotts, three individuals were arrested for producing 
methamphetamine in a clandestine laboratory, which police discovered by 
installing a radio transmitter in a container of chloroform and tracking the 
container’s movements from the chloroform manufacturing plant to a cabin in 
rural Wisconsin.56  At trial, one of the defendants moved to suppress the 
evidence of the methamphetamine laboratory, arguing that the use of a 
transmitter to track the car was an unreasonable search.57  The Supreme Court 
rejected the argument, explaining that use of the technology was not 
unconstitutional because police officers could have visually tracked the vehicle 
containing the chloroform container without using the disputed technology, and 
individual, as opposed to the place.  Id. § 4.4.1.1, at 124.  By reaffirming the open fields doctrine 
in Oliver, the Court confirmed this doctrine’s continued validity post-Katz.  See id.  In Hester, 
federal revenue officers, acting on a tip and without a warrant, observed the defendant give a  
passer-by a bottle of illegally-distilled moonshine whiskey from a distance of fifty to one hundred 
yards away.  Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).  After pursuing the defendant, the 
officers entered his father’s property, seized evidence of the illicit whiskey, and observed other cars 
approach the defendant’s home.  Id.  The defendant was convicted of concealing distilled spirits 
based on the officer’s observations, but challenged the evidence as being the product of an 
impermissible Fourth Amendment search.  Id. at 57–58.  The Court held that because the 
defendant’s movements uncovered the whiskey, the agents observations did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search as Fourth Amendment protections are “not extened to the open fields.”  Id. at 
58–59. 
 53. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 680 (noting that there will be a question of whether the area 
observed is an open field or curtilage when UAVs are used for surveillance, leading to the potential 
for Fourth Amendment implications). 
 54. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03, at 71. 
 55. See id., § 6.09[A], at 93–94 (noting the Court’s challenge in dealing with modern 
technology). 
 56. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–79 (1983).  Chloroform is a chemical used in 
the manufacturing of methamphetamine.  Id. at 278.  The police discovered the laboratory after 
obtaining a search warrant for the cabin based on the information gathered from the transmitter.  Id. 
at 279. 
 57. Id. 
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because the transmitter did not provide any information about activities inside 
the cabin.58 
The Court considered a similar issue but reached a different conclusion 
in United States v. Karo.59  In Karo, federal agents received information that 
three defendants purchased ether to extract cocaine from clothes imported into 
the United States.60  Before the defendants picked up the ether container, the 
agents placed an electronic monitoring device in the container and monitored 
the container’s movements.61  Based on the tracking information gathered, the 
police obtained a warrant to search the home where the officers believed the 
ether was being used.62  However, unlike the Knotts situation, the federal agents 
in Karo were unable to visually monitor the container during the entire 
transaction.63  Instead, they had to rely on the electronic monitoring device, 
which revealed the container’s movements both outside and inside the 
defendants’ home.64  The Supreme Court concluded that the agents’ actions in 
monitoring the container’s location with the electronic device while in the home 
constituted an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment search.65  The fact that the 
agents could not have verified the movements of the ether container inside the 
home without using the monitoring technology was critical to the Court’s 
analysis.66  Karo’s facts are differentiable from the facts in Knotts on this point 
because the tracker used in the Knotts container provided no information to the 
government about the container’s movement within the defendants’ cabin.67  
Thus, with reference to technological innovation, Karo reaffirmed the strong 
protection given to the home under the Fourth Amendment.68 
 58. Id. at 284–85; see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.09[C], at 96 
(explaining that the Court’s holding was based on two important facts: (1) the police could have 
secured the same information by following the defendant’s vehicle, and (2) the device had a limited 
use and did not reveal any private activities in the home). 
 59. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984). 
 60. Id. at 708. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 710. 
 63. Id. at 708–10.  The officers had also lost the signal of the transmitter in Knotts, but it was 
recovered within one hour. with assistance of a helicopter. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.  By contrast, 
the Karo agents lost track of their transmitter several occasions when it moved undetected between 
various locations. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10.  In each instance the police were ultimately able to 
relocate the tracker, in one instance to the very locker in which it was located .  Id. 
 64. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10. 
 65. Id. at 716–19 (explaining that the fact that the beeper monitored the container inside the 
home was of great importance to the Court’s determination given the presumption that warrantless 
searches of the home are unreasonable). 
 66. See id. at 715–16. 
 67. Id. at 715 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281) (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 718. 
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Kyllo v. United States reaffirmed this strong protection afforded to the interior 
of the home under the Fourth Amendment.69  In Kyllo, two federal agents, 
suspecting the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, sought to confirm 
their suspicions by using a thermal imaging camera to scan the defendant’s home 
from a vehicle parked across the street.70  The agents used the results of the scan 
to obtain a search warrant.71  Upon entering the home, the agents confirmed that 
the defendant was indeed growing over 100 marijuana plants inside.72  The 
defendant challenged the thermal scan as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.73  The Supreme Court held that the scan constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search, reasoning that government use of technology, not readily 
available for public use, without a warrant, to obtain intimate details of one’s 
home not otherwise discoverable without physical intrusion into the protected 
area, is an unreasonable search.74 
The Knotts, Karo and Kyllo trio of cases underscore the Fourth Amendment’s 
strong presumption in favor of protecting the home.75  The Court has emphasized 
“that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance of the house.’”76  
These cases suggest that if a technological innovation is used to gather details 
about a home that are not otherwise discoverable without physical intrusion into 
the space, whether from the ground or from the sky, then the use is a 
presumptively unreasonable search.77  These cases also indicate that technology 
used to conduct a search must be available for public use for the search to be 
considered reasonable.78 
 69. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal 
imaging device to measure the amount of heat coming from inside of a home violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 70. Id. at 29–30. 
 71. Id. at 30.  The scan revealed that “the roof over the garage and a side wall of [the 
defendant’s] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer 
than neighboring homes.”  Id.  This fact was consistent with the use of high-intensity halide lights 
for the interior growth of marijuana. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 40. 
 75. See supra notes 55, 63, 71 and accompanying text. 
 76. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). 
 77. Travis Dunlap, We’ve Got Our Eyes on You: When Surveillance by Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 173, 197 (2009). 
 78. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 683 (suggesting the test for whether a technology is available 
for general public use may “turn on whether Wal-Mart sells it or not”); see also Simmons, supra 
note 31, at 1334 (explaining that what the court likely meant by “general public use” is “that if a 
technology becomes so widespread and commonplace that it changes societal expectations of 
privacy, its use is no longer considered a ‘search’”). 
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5.  Ciraolo and Riley: The Fourth Amendment and Aerial Surveillance of the 
Home 
As UAVs become part of everyday day activities, the Supreme Court will not 
approach aerial surveillance in a void.  In the past, the Court has used Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether aerial surveillance 
of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.79  In California v. Ciraolo, 
two police officers, acting on a telephone tip, flew an airplane 1,000 feet over 
the defendant’s property, and were able to identify large marijuana plants 
growing in the defendant’s yard.80  Armed with the information gathered from 
the aerial surveillance, the officers obtained a search warrant, searched the 
defendant’s property, and found the marijuana plants.81  The defendant 
challenged the police’s flyover, arguing that an intricate fencing system 
surrounding the property expressed an expectation of privacy.82  The Supreme 
Court concluded that building fences around the property did not create a 
reasonable expectation that the area would not be viewed from above.83  The 
Court further stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does not require the 
police travelling in the public airways . . . to obtain a warrant in order to observe 
what is visible to the naked eye.”84  Finally, the Court concluded that because 
the observations were conducted from legally navigable airspace, the aerial 
surveillance did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.85 
 79. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.07[A], at 87–88 (explaining the basic 
rules for constitutional aerial surveillance); Vacek, supra note 51, at 682 (noting that the Court has 
generally held that aerial surveillance from an aircraft in navigable airspace is permitted because 
one does not have a privacy interest in anything that can be seen from above). 
 80. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).  The area where the defendant was 
growing marijuana was not visible from the ground because the yard was completely fenced in.  Id.  
The officers were readily able to identify the plants as marijuana using the naked eye.  Id. at 213. 
 81. Id. at 209–10. 
 82. Id. at 211. 
 83. Id. at 214.  In fact, the Court noted that the defendant’s fence was not sufficient to manifest 
a complete expectation of privacy because it would not be sufficient to “shield these plants from 
the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus”.  Id. at 211.  
The Court also noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”  Id. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
 84. Id. at 215. 
 85. Id. at 213–15.  Current federal regulations establish the following minimum safe altitudes 
for flight in an airplane: 1,000 feet “[o]ver any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over 
any open air assembly of persons” and 500 feet in all other areas.  14 C.F.R.  
§ 91.119(b)(c) (2012).   Helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-shift-control aircraft may 
operate at lower altitudes so long as “the operation is conducted without hazard to persons or 
property on the surface.”  § 91.119(d).  The Court reasoned that, while the yard was in the curtilage 
of the defendant’s home, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of curtilage only extends to “intimate 
activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” and police are not 
required to ignore what they can see from a public vantage point.  Ciarolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). 
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In Florida v. Riley, the Court extended the Ciraolo reasoning to a low level 
helicopter flyover that revealed that the defendant was growing marijuana in a 
greenhouse, which was within twenty feet of the defendant’s trailer and had 
translucent roofing with missing panels.86  The defendant challenged the aerial 
surveillance as an unreasonable search.87  The Supreme Court held that there 
was no violation of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant could not 
reasonably expect that his greenhouse was free from aerial observation.88  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the helicopter had been flying at a 
legal altitude and that it had not hindered the defendant’s use of the area 
surveyed.89 
Together, Ciarolo and Riley suggest that aerial surveillance of a home will 
generally not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.90  The holdings in these 
two cases though are limited to aerial surveillance conducted from “public 
 86. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–49 (1989).  In Riley, a police officer conducted a 
naked-eye aerial surveillance of the defendant’s property from a helicopter flying 400 feet above 
the defendant’s property.  Id. at 448.  During the flyover, the police officer identified marijuana 
through the openings in the roof and side of the greenhouse, neither of which were visible from 
public vantage points on the ground.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 447–48. 
 88. Id. at 450–51. 
 89. Id. at 450–52.  The Riley Court’s language appears to echo the language of United States 
v. Causby, where the Court considered whether low-level flyovers infringed on a person’s property 
rights.  See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946) (holding that “airspace, apart 
from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain” and that “[f]lights over 
private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate 
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land”).  One scholar questions whether the case facts 
truly support the Court’s decision by questioning how often low-level flights occur and how 
anticipated they are, noting that because flying “a helicopter at 400 feet over a residential dwelling 
may be technically allowed by regulation, it is neither prudent nor safe.  The noise and disruption 
produced would likely result in complaints and lawsuits, and the pilot’s options for safe landing in 
the event of an emergency are severely limited at that low altitude.”  Vacek, supra note 51, at 682 
n.51. 
 90. Vacek, supra note 51, at 681.  The use of aerial surveillance was also challenged in Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States.  Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986).  In 
Dow Chemical, a chemical manufacturer took significant security precautions to prevent its 2,000 
acre facility from being visible from the ground and the air.  Id. at 229.  The defendant challenged 
the government’s hiring of a private pilot to fly over its facility and take pictures with a “precision 
aerial mapping camera” as part of the government’s environmental regulation efforts.  Id.  The 
aerial surveillance was conducted without a warrant after the chemical manufacturer refused to 
allow Environmental Protection Agency officials to conduct a follow-up visit to photograph the 
facility.  Id.  Dow argued that the aerial surveillance constituted a search because it had a reasonable 
and legitimate expectation of privacy—the industrial complex was analogous to the curtilage of a 
home—and the aerial mapping camera enhanced the government’s senses in ways unavailable to 
the public.  Id. at 232–33.  The Supreme Court found that the government “was not employing 
some unique sensory device,” and that the industrial complex was “comparable to an open field 
and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public 
airspace.”  Id. at 238–39.  As a result, the Court concluded that the “aerial photographs of an 
industrial plant complex from navigable airspace” did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  
Id. at 239.  
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navigable airspace,” “in a physically nonintrusive manner,” and without 
revealing “intimate activities traditionally connected with the use of a home or 
curtilage.”91  Aerial surveillance is also subject to Kyllo’s requirement that the 
technology used to observe the home is available to the general public and that 
it does not reveal information about the inside of the home that is not apparent 
from the outside.92 
6.  United States v. Jones: Back to the Future, a New Twist or More of the 
Same? 
Decided in January 2012, United States v. Jones93 is arguably the Supreme 
Court’s most significant Fourth Amendment case since Katz.94  In Jones, federal 
agents and local police suspected the defendant was trafficking narcotics and 
installed a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on the car the 
defendant was driving.95  The data from the GPS device connected the defendant 
to a drug stash house and led to his indictment.96  At trial, the defendant 
challenged the GPS evidence as being the product of an unlawful search.97  The 
Supreme Court unanimously held that use of the GPS under the factual 
circumstances constituted a Fourth Amendment search.98  While the Justices 
agreed on the outcome, they reached the conclusion by three differing sets of 
analysis.99 
 91. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.07[A] at 87–88; see also United States v. 
Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that police observation of a marijuana 
growing operation from a helicopter at a height of 200 to 300 feet was not a search because the 
aircraft was at a legally permissible altitude,  there was no evidence that it interfered with the use 
of the property, and the flight was not so rare that the defendant could argue that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy); United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the use of National Guard helicopters to survey marijuana growing around a defendant’s residence 
did not constitute a search). 
 92. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 93. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (finding that a search occurred when a 
GPS was placed on a car by the police), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 94. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States 
v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (stating that the Jones decision “has 
the potential to be the Supreme Court’s most important Fourth Amendment decision since it 
decided Katz v. United States”). 
 95. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  The car was registered in the name of the defendant’s wife.  Id.  
The District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police obtained a warrant to install a GPS device on the 
car in the District of Columbia within ten days of the warrant’s issue.  Id.  However, the GPS device 
was installed on the eleventh day and in the neighboring state of Maryland.  Id.  Subsequently, the 
government used the GPS device to track the defendant’s movements for a period of twenty-eight 
days and obtained over two thousand pages of data.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 948–49.  The defendant’s first trial, for the same charge, ended with a hung jury, 
and he was indicted again.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 948. 
 98. Id. at 947, 949. 
 99. See infra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s majority opinion, which changed the Fourth 
Amendment search analysis to include both Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test and the traditional property rights determination.100  Justice Scalia 
described Jones as a case in which the police physically intruded onto the 
Defendant’s property to obtain information.101  He reasoned that the framers of 
the Fourth Amendment drafted the text to have a property connection and that 
the police action in Jones would have been considered unreasonable at the time 
of the Amendment’s adoption.102  Justice Scalia explained that the Katz test 
“added to, not substituted for, the common law trespassory test” and used the 
historical property rights analysis to conclude that the installation of the GPS 
tracking system on the defendant’s car was a search.103 
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Scalia’s analysis that a Fourth 
Amendment search occurs when the government enters into a constitutionally 
protected area to collect information.104  However, in a separate concurring 
opinion, Justice Sotomayor emphasized the importance of the Katz test, 
explaining that without a physical trespass, Fourth Amendment analysis is 
determined by a violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.105  
Thus, both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor viewed the historical property rights 
test and Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test as a two part inquiry, 
working together to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search has 
occurred.106  However, Justice Sotomayor also agreed with Justice Alito’s 
assessment that both tests may be ill-suited for current realities.107  Justice 
Sotomayor acknowledged that technological advances mean that a physical 
entry is not necessary for surveillance, and noted that the trespass doctrine may 
not be helpful when evaluating cases involving advanced surveillance 
technologies.108  She also highlighted that these advances will impact the Katz 
test because the advances will lead to different societal expectations of 
privacy.109  Justice Sotomayor also explained that Katz’s proposition that if an 
individual chooses to disclose information to another, then such information 
 100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953; see also Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: 
Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 153 (2012) (describing how Justice 
Scalia’s opinion “construct[s] a ‘new’ test that is purely property-rights driven”  and is “the starting 
point for the emergence, or perhaps re-emergence, of a ‘trespass-first’ test”). 
 101. Jones, 132 Sup. Ct. at 949. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 948–49, 952–53.  The Court’s embrace of the property-based analysis is significant 
because Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test had served as the basis of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment search analysis for nearly 40 years.  CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 
25, § 3.1.1, at 47. 
 104. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 105. Id. at 954–55 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 106. See id. at 952–55. 
 107. Id. at 955. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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cannot reasonably be expected to be private, does not acknowledge the new 
challenges of the digital information age where individuals reveal information 
about themselves regularly in the course of an ordinary routine.110  Accordingly, 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion suggests the need to re-analyze the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.111 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion also expressed concern that current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not meet the needs of the populous in light of 
emerging technologies.112  While Justice Alito opined that the Katz test should 
be the sole Fourth Amendment test, he also made a distinction between short 
and long-term monitoring of persons, concluding that only short-term 
monitoring is reasonable.113   Justice Alito ultimately called for legislative action 
 110. Id. at 957.  Justice Sotomayor notes the following examples: “[p]eople disclose the phone 
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers, the URLs that they visit and the e-mail 
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries 
and medications they purchase to online retailers.”  Id. 
 111. Scholars have pointed to the language in Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinions to suggest that a majority of Supreme Court Justices would support a mosaic 
theory of the Fourth Amendment. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012).  Under the mosaic theory, a single act of permissible 
surveillance may not amount to a Fourth Amendment search, but an on-going sequence of 
permissible observations may together become an impermissible search, as “[p]rolonged 
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance.”  See United 
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d 
in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), mandamus denied sub nom. In re 
Jones 670 F.3d 256 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Kerr, supra, at 313 (explaining that the mosaic theory 
allows the Court to consider the constitutionality of searches “as a collective sequence of steps 
rather than as individual steps”).  Notably, the mosaic theory supplied the basis of the District of 
Columbia Circuit’s opinion in Jones.  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Kerr, supra (noting 
that the D.C. Circuit court adopted the mosaic theory in Jones).  The mosaic theory originated in 
national security jurisprudence, as courts wrestled with the correct application of the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) in light of concerns that ordinarily insignificant information may 
become more important when aggregated with other information.  Bethany L. Dickman, Note, 
Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. 
Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2011).  The courts’ concerns were based on fears that a 
potential adversary of the United States “could use FOIA to gather individual items of information 
and piece them together to discover and exploit vulnerabilities.”  Id. at 736–37. 
 112. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito criticizes the 
property-rights test, explaining that the fact that an originalist approach considering what law 
enforcement officials may have done at the time the Constitution was ratified is an “unwise” and 
“highly artificial” means of determining what constituted a search.  Id. at 957–58.  Justice Alito 
also asserted that the property-rights test is unsupported by current law and the language of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Justice Alito also expressed concerns about maintaining Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test because as technology changes, so will people’s expectations. See id. at 
962. 
 113. Id. at 964.  Justice Alito applied the Katz test to the Jones facts and found that, under the 
objective prong, society has recognized that monitoring an individual’s movements on public 
streets for a short period of time is reasonable, but that long-term use of GPS devices for the same 
purpose encroaches on privacy expectations.  Id. 
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in light of the judiciary’s limited powers to address privacy concerns raised by 
emerging technologies that can impact Fourth Amendment protections.114 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones thus suggests that both the traditional 
property-rights approach and the Katz test are valid analyses to determine when 
a Fourth Amendment search occurs.  Therefore, cases involving UAVs should 
be analyzed using both tests.115 
B.  A New Challenge for the Fourth Amendment: The Domestic Use of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is Set to Expand 
While the history of drones is as long as the history of aviation,116 the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) safety regulations have served as a 
significant impediment to widespread civilian use of UAVs in the United 
States.117  The FAA Modernization and Reform Act requires the FAA to 
 114. Id. at 964; see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (stating that 
“statutory rules rather than constitutional rules should provide the primary source of privacy 
protections regulating law-enforcement use of rapidly developing technologies”). 
 115. The Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines reaffirmed that the traditional 
property rights analysis of the Fourth Amendment is, together with the Katz test, a valid “search” 
test.  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).  In Jardines, the Court held that a 
police officer’s approach to the front door of a home with a drug-sniffing dog in order to obtain 
information about the presence of marijuana in the home constituted a Fourth Amendment search.  
Id. at 1413, 1417–18.  The Court reasoned that by approaching the home’s front door, the officer 
impermissibly trespassed upon the home’s curtilage, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment.  
Id. at 1414. 
 116. See Charles Jarnot, History, in INTRODUCTION TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1, 1 
(Richard Barnhart et al. eds., 2012); Dunlap, supra note 77, at 176–79 (tracing UAVs back to an 
aircraft developed for the Navy in 1915).  In fact, Charles Jarnot traced the history of unnamed 
aerial vehicles to the kites, hot air balloons and other early aircraft that pre-date the dawn of modern 
aviation.  Jarnot, supra, at 1–2.  First developed as an Aerial Torpedo for the U.S. Navy in 1918, 
the military has extensively used UAVs for reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering roles over 
the last century.  Id. at 3, 5, 7–14; Dunlap, supra note 77, at 176–79.  Today, there are approximately 
7,494 UAVs serving the U.S. military, which accounts for approximately forty-one percent of the 
U.S. military’s total aircraft inventory.  GERTLER, supra note 7, at 9, fig. I.  The military’s use of 
drones has increased exponentially in the last decade; by comparison, in 2005 UAVs comprised 
only five percent of military aircraft.  Id. at 9.  The U.S. military first widely deployed contemporary 
UAV systems during Operation Desert Storm, which illustrated their potential, thereby resulted in 
fast-tracking investments in modern UAV systems.  Id. at 2; see also Jarnot, supra at 14–15.  
Improved drone systems also debuted during U.S. operations in the Balkans in the 1990s.  
GERTLER, supra note 7, at 2.  However, UAVs did not gain the  
pre-eminent military roles that they have today until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq  
post-9/11.  See Jarnot, supra at 15. 
 117. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 686–88 (noting that the burdensome FAA authorization 
process has challenged law enforcement’s ability to operate drones).  Aiming to maintain UAV 
operations apart from “airspace frequently traversed by jet airliners and helicopters,” the FAA 
typically only permits UAVs to operate “over relatively unpopulated areas.”  Dunlap, supra note 
77, at 182–83.  FAA regulations also require all UAV operators to obtain a Certificate of 
Authorization (COA) prior to use, a process overseen by small office within the FAA that has been 
overwhelmed by applications.  Vacek, supra note 51, at 686–87.  Once the operator obtains a COA, 
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establish regulations for the testing and licensing of commercial drones by 2015 
and charges the FAA with expediting the Certificate of Authorization process 
within the ninety day period after the law was passed.118  Many fear these 
provisions will lead to an expansion of the use of UAVs by law enforcement and 
may result in more Brossart-like events around the country.119  In fact, the FAA 
estimates that as many as 15,000 UAVs may be in the nation’s skies by 2020.120  
Some predict that UAV use could soon grow into an eighty-nine billion dollar 
industry worldwide.121 
it is “only valid for a limited time and [imposes] strict requirements, such as daylight only flights, 
required ‘chase’ aircraft and numerous safety precautions.” Dunlap, supra note 77, at 183.  A chase 
aircraft is “a manned aircraft that is used to follow a UA[V] and serves as the see-and-avoid function 
for total flight safety.  The pilot of the chase aircraft monitors for conflicting aircraft and is in 
constant radio contact with the pilot in command of the UA[V] who is on the ground.”  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: MEASURING 
PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION 
INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 15 n.22 (2012). 
 118. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §§ 332, 334, 126 
Stat. 73, 76–77.  The deadline for publishing the expedited COA regulations was November 10, 
2012. Tim Starks, Fear of Prying, CQ WEEKLY, Oct. 22, 2012, at 2090, 2097.  The Act also requires 
that the FAA to: 
[n]ot later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act . . .  issue guidance 
regarding the operation of public unmanned aircraft systems to (1) expedite the issuance 
of a certificate of authorization process;(2) provide for a collaborative process with 
public agencies to allow for an incremental expansion of access to the national airspace 
system as technology matures and the necessary safety analysis and data become 
available, and until standards are completed and technology issues are resolved . . . 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, § 334(a)(1)-(2); see also §§ 331–335 (providing 
more rules and guidance on how the act must be implemented).  In contrast to the United States, 
Japan, South Korea, and Israel have already fully integrated UAVs into their national airspace 
systems.  CHAD HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21698, HOMELAND 
SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE 7 (2010).  Id. 
 119. Shaun Waterman, Coming to a Sky Near You; Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A1. 
 120. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 
2010-2030, at 48 (2010). 
 121. See Starks, supra note 118 at 2091.  UAV use has expanded to the civilian sector and is 
used for a number of purposes from weather forecasting, to homeland security and traffic 
enforcement.  See Dunlap, supra note 77, at 179 (stating that civilian missions for UAVs include 
“emissions monitoring, weather forecasting, topographical mapping, wildlife management, 
wildfire prevention and response, water management, homeland security, various commercial 
applications and traffic management”).  A number of companies and states are actively seeking to 
profit from the expansion of civilian UAV use.  See Barry Neild, Not just for Military Use, Drones 
Turn Civilian, CNN (June 12, 2013 6:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/world 
/europe/civilian-drones-farnborough/index.html.  For example, the head of Maryland’s Office of 
Military and Federal Affairs sees the state as uniquely positioned to benefit from the impending 
UAV boom.  See Matthew Hay Brown, Maryland Sees a Future in Drones, BALT. SUN (Aug. 13, 
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-13/news/bs-md-drones-20120813_1_unmanned 
-aircraft-drones-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.  He highlighted that Maryland already has at least  
two-dozen businesses working on UAVs and that the state boasts a unique combination of 
universities, federal facilities, and private sector interest in the industry.  Id.  Similarly, the 
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The widespread use of UAVs in the United States has the potential to change 
many aspects of daily life.122  UAVs can be used both for commercial purposes 
such as photography and agricultural purposes, 123 as well as for governmental 
purposes such as surveillance.124  Most public concern about the expanded use 
of UAVs relates to their use by law enforcement as they give agencies the ability 
to consistently monitor and investigate suspects from the sky, which potentially 
government of Oklahoma has developed a strategic plan to encourage the development of UAV 
businesses in the state.  See GOVERNOR’S UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS COUNCIL, REPORT OF 
THE GOVERNOR’S UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS COUNCIL: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 5 
(2012).  The plan emphasized that Oklahoma has a number of advantages over other states in the 
development of UAV business, including its robust infrastructure to support UAV test flights, 
mature aviation market, and favorable geographical location.  Id. at 5, 11–14.  The UAV design 
and development industry has grown organically along the Columbia River Gorge Region on the 
Washington-Oregon border, where a number of amateur aeronautical engineers and start-up 
enterprises are developing drone technology that has been adopted by the military and exhibited 
around the world.  See Richard Connif, Drones are Ready for Takeoff, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 
2011), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Drones-are-Ready-for 
-Takeoff.html?c=y&page=1.  On December 30, 2013, the FAA announced the selection of six 
congressionally-mandated UAV test sites that will conduct necessary research for the integration 
of UAVs into the national airspace system. Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA 
Selects Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research and Test Sites (Dec. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news 
_story.cfm?newsid=15576.  The six test sites are located in Alaska, Nevada, New York, North 
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.  Id. 
 122. See Connif, supra note 121 (suggesting that “the adjustment to drones will be as 
challenging as the adjustment to horseless carriages at the start of the 20th Century” and chronicling 
how  drones are increasingly used for civilian purposes and for performing new missions that 
formerly required a human-guided aircraft). 
 123. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 77, at 179 n.43 (noting that most UAVs are used 
commercially in “Japan for agricultural purposes” and that they can do the work of approximately 
fifteen men).  UAVs are also being marketed as an inexpensive alternative to private security.  See 
Neild, supra note 121. 
 124. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) (2011), 
available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_fact_sheet.pdf [hereinafter FAA, 
FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS].  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
operates the largest law enforcement drone fleet in the United States.  See Rob Margetta & Tim 
Starks, Eyes on the Border, at a High Cost, CQ WEEKLY, Oct. 22, 2012, at 2094, 2094.  However, 
a number of CBP’s drones are not being used to their maximum potential due to their high operating 
costs.  Id. at 2094–95.  Other federal agencies operating drones within the United States include: 
the Department of Defense, which utilizes them for “training for overseas operations”; NASA, 
which employs them for “wildfire mapping and collect[ing] hurricane data”; the Department of the 
Interior, which uses them for “Geological Survey studies”; the Department of Energy, which 
conducts “drone research at national laboratories”; The Department of Justice, for FBI law 
-enforcement support; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which 
conducts “drone research”; and the Department of State, which is testing drones for its “embassy 
surveillance program.”  Starks, supra note 118, at 2092.  State and local government agencies, 
including the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, the Miami-Dade, Florida Police 
Department and the Montgomery County, Texas Sheriff’s Office are also using drone for a variety 
of missions.  Id. at 2092–93. 
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diminishes Fourth Amendment protections.125  This concern is heightened 
because UAVs are able to conduct surveillance undetected due to their design 
and their capability to fly at high altitudes.126  As the cost of using UAVs 
decreases, and their ease of use and availability increases,127 many fear that 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not afford enough protection 
from government surveillance by drones.128 
C.  State v. Brossart: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Become Part of American Life 
Against the background of an expected expansion of domestic UAV use State 
v. Brossart has attracted widespread media attention because it is among the 
earliest and most dramatic cases involving UAV use by law enforcement 
 125. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 677 (discussing how new legislation should be enacted to 
deal with the new issues raised by the use of drones); Associated Press, Talk of Drones Patrolling 
U.S. Skies Spawns Anxiety, USA TODAY (June 19, 2012 9:13 AM), http://www.usa 
today.com/news/washington/story/2012-06-19/drone-backlash/55682654/1 (noting how many 
groups have raised concerns about the privacy issues related to drone use); Koebler, supra note 17 
(discussing a Brookings Institute Panel that focused on UAV use and warned that, while UAVs can 
benefit law enforcement and businesses, the implications of widespread use should be thoroughly 
considered by the government); Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-
you (highlighting the extensive surveillance capabilities of UAVs and their ability to go undetected, 
raising Fourth Amendment concerns).  In fact, the FBI has acknowledged that it has already 
deployed drones in limited domestic law enforcement operations.  See Craig Whitlock, FAA Says 
it Authorized 4 FBI Drone Missions, WASH. POST, June 21, 2013, at A7 (detailing FBI use of drones 
on United States soil during four FBI missions); Jake Miller, FBI Director Acknowledges Domestic 
Drone Use, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162 
-57590065/fbi-director-acknowledges-domestic-drone-use/.  Other concerns regarding the 
increased civilian UAV use include the fear that they may threaten air safety, cause mid-air 
collisions, or be used as a terrorist weapon.  Starks, supra note 118, at 2096. 
 126. Lynch, supra note 125.  Modern UAVs “come in a variety of shapes and sizes” and can 
have a “wingspan as large as a Boeing 737 or be smaller than a radio-controlled model aircraft.”  
FAA, FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, supra note 124.  The U.S. military’s largest 
drone, the Global Hawk, has a length of 48 feet, a wingspan of 131 feet, weighs 32,250 pounds and 
can reach an altitude of 60,000 feet.  GERTLER, supra note 7, at 31 tbl.6, 32 fig.5.  In contrast, CQ 
Weekly highlights that AeroVironment, Inc. has developed the Nano Hummingbird, a drone that 
weighs less than an ounce.  Starks, supra note 118, at 2091.  In fact, there has been speculation in 
the press that the United States has developed and utilized insect-sized UAVs that allow for nearly 
undetectable close-range surveillance.  Tom Leonard, US Accused of Using Robotic Insect Spies, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (Oct. 11, 2007), at 19. 
 127. See Abramson, supra note 17 (examining how homemade UAVs are being built and 
operated by hobbyists using readily available parts at a lower cost and how police departments in 
rural areas can use them because they are small and easily transported). 
 128. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090, 2092, 2095 (reporting that many members of 
Congress are concerned by both the loss of privacy drones may cause and the Court’s failure to 
adequately curtail aerial surveillance, leading to Republican and Democratic members of Congress 
introducing legislation to strengthen the public’s privacy protections again the government’s use of 
drones on civilians). 
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officials in United States.129  The conflict arose in June 2011 when three  
cow-calf pairs belonging to Chris Anderson entered an abandoned missile site 
rented by Rodney Brossart.130  After locating the cattle on Brossart’s rented 
property, Anderson approached Brossart and offered to remove the cattle from 
Brossart’s land.131  However, Brossart told Anderson that he could not remove 
the cattle until he paid for the damages they had done to his property.132  
Anderson then contacted the Nelson County, North Dakota Sheriff’s Office for 
assistance in recovering the cattle.133 
Upon learning of the disagreement between Anderson and Brossart, the 
sheriff’s office dispatched officers to speak with Brossart regarding the disputed 
cattle.134  During that conversation, the officers advised Brossart that they had 
proof of Anderson’s ownership of the cattle and offered to confirm ownership 
by looking at the cattle.135  In response, Brossart warned the officers that they 
would not return if they attempted to enter his property.136  Taking this warning 
 129. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2093 (discussing the use of a drone in a situation involving 
a North Dakota rancher); Koebler, supra note 6 (explaining the holding in Brossart validated the 
use of UAVs under the circumstances); Koebler, supra note 10 (laying out the facts in Brossart and 
stating that Brossart was “the first American citizen to be arrested with the help of a Predator 
surveillance drone”); see also Domestic Drone Justice: US Court Green-Lights Police UAV Use, 
supra note 10 (reporting the Brossart decision on a Russian-sponsored news website). 
 130. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss at 2, State v. Brossart, No. 
32-2011-CR-00049 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012). 
 131. Id. at 2–3. 
 132. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049 
(Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012).  Brossart alleged that Anderson’s cow-calf pairs consumed “feed 
and hay intended for the Brossarts’ own cattle,” and that he was acting consistent with North Dakota 
law by requiring payment for their return.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 36-11-10(1) (2011)) 
(according to North Dakota law, “the person suffering damages by reason of the trespass of any 
livestock may take up the offending livestock” and “may retain the livestock . . . until 
 . . . [t]he damages sustained by reason of the trespass and the costs in the action to recover the 
damages have been paid.”). 
 133. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 2–3; State’s Response to 
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3. 
 134. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3; State’s Response to 
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3.  The Brossart events took place 
in Lakota, North Dakota, a small town with a population of 672.  Koebler, supra note 10; see 
Community Facts for Lakota City, North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder 
2.census.gov/ (enter “Lakota City, North Dakota” in state, county, town, or zip code search box 
and click on “Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010” under the “2010 
Demographic Profile SF” Dataset).  Brossart had a history of litigating against the Nelson County 
Sherriff’s Office.  See State v. Brossart, 729 N.W.2d 137 (N.D. 2007) (affirming Brossart’s 
conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest based on a confrontation with police 
following a citation for unauthorized maintenance of a road); State’s Response to Defendants’ 
Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 7–8.  The officers, accompanied by a field agent 
of the North Dakota Stockmen’s Association, located Brossart while he was working near his farm.  
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 3; State’s Response to Defendants’ 
Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3. 
 135. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3. 
 136. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip Op., at 3–4 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012). 
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as a threat, the officers asked Brossart to cooperate or face arrest.137  Brossart 
ignored their request and returned to his tractor, prompting the officers to detain 
him.138  The officers then approached Thomas Brossart, Brossart’s adult son 
who had arrived on the scene, and requested to enter the Brossart property to 
“check on the cattle.”139  Thomas advised the officers that they would not be 
allowed on the property to see the cattle until they had a valid search warrant.140  
The officers then left the scene to obtain a warrant.141 
The officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to enter the rented land 
that afternoon and served the warrant at the Brossart home, which was located a 
half-mile from the rented land.142  However, as they entered onto Brossart’s 
property to serve the search warrant, the three Brossart sons, Alex, Thomas and 
Jacob, rushed at the officers with guns drawn.143  This action resulted in a 
standoff between the officers and the three sons.144  During the standoff, the 
police deployed an MQ-9 Predator B Drone obtained through an agreement with 
 137. Id. at 4. 
 138. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3; State’s Response to 
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3.  The police argue that Brossart 
was arrested for committing the following misdemeanors under the North Dakota Livestock Estray 
Law: “resisting arrest, criminal mischief, theft of property and terrorizing.” Id. at 4, 12.  Brossart 
actively resisted his arrest and ordered the officers to “show him the writ.”  Id. at 3.  As a result, 
the officers tased Brossart several times before placing Brossart in the patrol car.  Brief in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3–4. Following the incident, “Brossart appeared to be 
passed out and unresponsive” and an ambulance was called.  Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR 
-00049, at 4.  Jacob and Abby Brossart, two of Brossart’s adult children, were also detained during 
this initial encounter.  Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3–4; State’s 
Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 9–10.  The police claim 
that Jacob Brossart was detained for approaching the Brossart pickup after his father yelled at him 
to get two rifles located in the front seat of the pickup.  State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined 
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 9.  He was not arrested at that time and he was released after 
his father was placed in the police car.  Id.  Abby was arrested after she struck the right arm of one 
of the officers.  State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 
9–10. 
 139. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4. 
 140. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10. 
 141. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4; State’s Response to 
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10. 
 142. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4; State’s Response to 
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10.  Prior to serving the warrant at 
the Brossart home, officers returned to the Brossart’s rented property, where they were confronted 
by Thomas and Alex Brossart.  Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, at 5.  The police then approached 
the Brossart home to serve the search warrant directly to an adult from whose property the evidence 
was being taken.  See State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
130, at 10–11.  North Dakota law allows an officer who is taking property under a warrant to serve 
the warrant directly to the person who owns the property from which the property is taken or leave 
to it at the location from where the property was taken.  N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2). 
 143. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10. 
 144. Id. 
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the United States Department of Homeland Security.145  The UAV was deployed 
without obtaining an additional warrant, purportedly “to help assure that there 
weren’t any weapons [on the Brossart property] and to make the arrest safer for 
both the Brossarts and law enforcement.”146  The next morning, officers entered 
the Brossart property to recover the cattle and arrested three of the Brossart 
children after they again confronted officers.147  The Brossarts did not learn that 
a UAV had been deployed during the standoff until after their arrest.148 
The Brossarts filed motions to dismiss the criminal charges against them or, 
in the alternative, to suppress evidence against them.149  They contended that the 
court should suppress the evidence gathered through the use of the UAV because 
UAV technology is not available to the general public,150 and because it was 
obtained in an unreasonable manner.151  The trial court denied the motions, 
finding that “there was no improper use of an unmanned aerial vehicle,” as “[i]t 
appears to have had no bearing on” the charges brought against the Brossarts.152 
 145. See Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, at 6; Koebler, supra note 6.  U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security, currently operates 
the largest law enforcement drone fleet in the United States.  Margetta & Starks, supra note 124, at 
2094–95.  The fleet is made up of 10 MQ-9 Predator B’s that are used to monitor the U.S. border.  
Id.  CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones have a length of 36 feet, a wingspan of 66 feet, and can operate 
for up to 20 hours at an altitude of up to 50,000 feet and with a speed of up to 240 knots (276 miles 
per hour).  Id.  CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones operate from four bases around the United States, 
including one in Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota.  Id.  This type of cooperation 
between CBP and local law enforcement is not unprecedented; drones from various DHS 
components have been used domestically to “support federal and state agencies such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD) Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service and the Texas Rangers.”  RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 3 (2012). 
 146. KOEBLER, supra note 10; see Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 
5, 19 (discussing the warrantless use of the UAV that gathered the intelligence); State’s Response 
to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 12 (acknowledging the use of the 
drone, but arguing that it was not used for investigative purposes). 
 147. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 5.  The Brossart children were 
arrested for “commit[ing] the offense of terrorizing.” State’s Resp. to Defs.’ Combined Mot. to 
Dismiss, supra note 130, at 13. 
 148. Koebler, supra note 10. 
 149. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 1.  The Brossarts presented the 
following arguments: (1) the charges presented against Rodney Brossart were improvident; (2) 
Rodney Brossart was improperly arrested without a warrant as a crime had not occurred;  
(3) the police used excessive force in Rodney Brossart’s arrest; (4) unlawful de facto arrest of Jacob 
Brossart; (5) unlawful arrest of Abbey Brossart; (6) warrantless entry into the Brossart property; 
(7) the use of the UAV was unlawful; and (8) general use of outrageous police conduct, requiring 
suppression of the evidence.  Id. at 8, 12, 15, 17–20. 
 150. Id. at 19 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001)). 
 151. Id. at 20. 
 152. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012). 
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II.  THE BROSSART FACTS DO NOT AMOUNT TO A FOURTH AMENDMENT 
SEARCH 
Based on the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
determination of whether the Brossart facts constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search must be made using both the historical property right analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.153  
Applying these tests, the Brossart court correctly found that use of a UAV did 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.154  However, the Brossart decision 
underscores that the Fourth Amendment should provide greater protections 
against searches by UAVs and similar technologies. 
A.  Applying the Property Rights Test in Brossart 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones breathed new life into the traditional 
property rights analysis of the Fourth Amendment, which now must be used in 
conjunction with Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test to analyze 
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.155  Under this test, the 
government’s physical trespass on private property in an effort to discover 
information is an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search.156  Existing case law 
suggests that the government’s use of a UAV in circumstances like those 
in Brossart does not constitute a trespass.157 
Current jurisprudence on low-altitude airspace property rights is not  
well-defined.158  In United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court held that 
“[f]lights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so 
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use 
of the land.”159  This language is echoed in Ciraolo and Riley, which suggest 
that investigations conducted from an airplane or a helicopter flying from legally 
navigable airspace do not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, unless the 
investigation affects the defendant’s use of his property.160  Applying these 
precedents, the Brossart court found that the government’s use of a UAV did 
 153. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 154. See KOEBLER, supra note 10. 
 155. See supra, Part I.A.6. 
 156. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 
F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, at 51–55 
(discussing the property rights analysis, which looked at Fourth Amendment questions in light of 
whether a constitutionally protected area was breached). 
 157. See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 
56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 198 (1990) (“With no definitive standard yet enunciated, and courts mixed 
in their approach to the question, landowners must still wonder just exactly what their property 
rights are to the airspace above their land.”). 
 159. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946).  The Causby decision recognized 
that “airspace is a public highway,” but emphasized that a landowner “must have exclusive control 
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”  Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
 160. See supra note 86 Part I.A.5. 
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not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no evidence that 
the flyover occurred outside navigable airspace or interfered with the Brossart’s 
use of the land.161 
Given the facts, the Brossarts could not argue that a trespass occurred.  In their 
brief, the Brossarts alleged that the UAV “was not visible or detectable by 
ordinary observation.”162  This allegation suggests that the MQ-9 Predator B 
drone used during the standoff must have been at a sufficient altitude to fly 
undetected.163  Brossart also admitted that he did not learn of the drone’s use 
until months after his arrest, indicating that the drone did not interfere with his 
use of the land.164  Thus, the Brossart court could not find that the Government 
physically trespassed into Brossart’s land. 
B.  Applying the Katz Test in Brossart 
To successfully prove that the Nelson County Sherriff Office’s deployment of 
a UAV over their property during the standoff constituted a Fourth Amendment 
search, the Brossarts needed to meet both the subjective and objective prongs of 
the Katz test in order.165  As the Brossarts’ property was marked with a “No 
Trespassing” sign, and they repeatedly asked the sheriff to produce a search 
warrant, it seems clear that they possessed a subjective expectation of privacy 
and thus easily met Katz’s subjective prong.166  However, applying the 
principles established through subsequent Katz-based jurisprudence, the 
Brossarts had difficulty meeting the objective prong of the test.167 
1.  The Brossart Court Could Not Find That the Technology Used to Survey 
the Brossart’s Property was Unreasonable 
The Brossarts’ strongest argument that the use of the UAV did not comport 
with society’s expectations of privacy is Kyllo’s assertion that a government 
search investigating the details of a home and utilizing “a device that is not in 
general public use” is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.168  Under this argument, the defendants could have challenged 
 161. See infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text. 
 162. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19. 
 163. The MQ-9 Predator B is a relatively large drone that can travel at up to 276 miles per hour 
at an altitude of 50,000 feet.  See supra note 141.  In fact, the MQ-9 Predator B is thirteen feet 
longer, has a wingspan sixteen feet longer and a more powerful engine than earlier Predator models.  
GERTLER, supra note 7, at 35.  Flying at altitude above 500 feet is generally considered to be within 
navigable airspace in rural areas.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 164. KOEBLER, supra note 10. 
 165. See supra, Part I A.6. 
 166. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189 n.9 (1984) (acknowledging that by placing 
“No Trespassing” signs and fences, the defendants may have had an expectation of privacy). 
 167. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 168. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 40 (2001). 
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both the use of the UAV to survey their property, as well as the use of the 
technology that the UAV carries. 
a.  Past Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Permits Aerial Surveillance 
Even applying the Kyllo standard, the court correctly found that the mere use 
of the UAV does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  In its aerial 
surveillance jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the 
government is free to inspect what is visible from “the vantage point of an 
aircraft flying in the navigable airspace.”169  Observation conducted from a UAV 
is analogous to observation conducted from airplanes and helicopters.170  This 
analogy suggests that, as the use of aerial surveillance has become 
commonplace, the court’s decision in Brossart is in line with the Supreme 
Court’s aerial surveillance decisions.171 
b.  The Brossart Defendants Did Not Challenge the Use of the Technology 
Carried by the Drone 
The Brossarts’ best argument would have been a challenge to the use of the 
technology carried by the UAV.  CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones are equipped 
with electro-optical and infrared sensors and a surface search radar that can 
locate moving targets on the ground.172  Unlike aircrafts, these tools are  
sense-enhancing technologies not in general public use and can be compared to 
the infrared thermal image scanner used by government agents in Kyllo.173  
However, while the Brossarts argued that Kyllo’s holding on sense-enhancing 
technology should apply in their case, they failed to challenge the use of these 
 169. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213–14 (1986) (concluding that the defendant’s expectation of privacy from information that it 
willingly exposed to aerial surveillance “is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is 
prepared to honor”). 
 170. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM MQ-9 PREDATOR B (2011), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler 
/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/marine/uas.ctt/uas.pdf.  In fact, the MQ-9 Predator B may be more 
analogous to airplanes and helicopters than other UAVs as it is remotely piloted from the ground.  
Id.  In contrast, future drone systems could be fully automated and controlled entirely by on-board 
computers and sensors.  See Starks, supra note 118, at 2096 (reporting that Congress allowed the 
FAA to authorize that drones be outfitted with technologies that avoid collisions and allow them to 
become pilotless); Connif, supra note 121 (describing how current unmanned aircraft “typically 
require at least two people . . . doing ground control” and that developers are envisioning future 
drones that could “take off . . . land [and] refuel without human assistance”). 
 171. See supra Part I.A.5. 
 172. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, supra note 170. 
 173. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30, 34 (discussing the mechanics of the thermal imagers and 
describing the technology as not commonly used by the public). 
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technologies, instead concentrating exclusively on the UAV itself.174  As this 
argument was not articulated, the Brossart court could not consider it.175 
2.  The Brossarts Did Not Allege that the UAV Observed the Interior of the 
Brossart Home 
The Brossart argument that the government violated the Fourth Amendment 
by using technological capabilities unavailable to the general public was 
insufficient for the court to find that a Fourth Amendment search occurred.176  
In Oliver, the Court held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in activities conducted in open fields, except for those intimate activities 
conducted within the curtilage of the home.177  Oliver also demonstrates that 
“open fields” is an expansive term that includes closed-off areas close to a 
defendant’s home, even if the areas cannot be seen from publicly-accessible 
land.178  To successfully challenge the use of a UAV as an impermissible search, 
the Brossarts needed to demonstrate that the UAV and its instruments revealed 
information about the interior of their home.179  The Brossart facts do not 
provide sufficient information about the specific areas the UAV observed and 
the Brossarts did not argue that the UAV revealed any information about the 
interior of their home.180  As a result, the Brossart court could not consider this 
argument.181 
3.  The Length of the UAV Observations May Not Have Been Unreasonable 
Applying the Katz test in his Jones dissent, Justice Alito wrote that, under 
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “relatively short-term monitoring of 
a person’s movements” is considered reasonable, but “longer term” monitoring 
“impinges on expectations of privacy” in many situations.182  While Justice 
Alito’s decision does not clearly identify the line between short and long-term 
surveillance, this language suggests that the Brossarts could have challenged the 
 174. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19. 
 175. See State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 
2012). 
 176. See id. (finding that the use of a UAV was not unreasonable in this case); Brief in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19 (noting that the Kyllo decision suggests that the use of 
sense-enhancing technology is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 177. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
 178. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding a Fourth Amendnet violation 
where technology not in public use was used to gather information about the interior of the home). 
 180. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20. 
 181. See Brossart, No. 23-2011-CR-00049 at 12 (dismissing the UAV argument without 
discussion). 
 182. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring), mandamus 
denied sub nom. In re Joes, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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length of the UAV observations.183  However, the Brossart facts suggest that the 
UAV’s observations were conducted over a short period of time on the morning 
when the arrests took place,184 which is far shorter than the four-week period of 
observation implicated in Jones.185  Furthermore, the Brossarts failed to present 
the argument that the length of the observations was unreasonable.186  As a 
result, the Brossart court was unable to find that the period of observation was 
unreasonably long.187 
C.  The Brossart Court Correctly Found that the Use of an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Did Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search 
The Nelson County District Court correctly found that the use of a UAV did 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.  Based on current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the court could have only concluded that a Fourth 
Amendment search had occurred if the defendants alleged that the UAV carried 
sense-enhancing technology that was used to monitor the interior of the Brossart 
home.188  The Brossart’s Brief in Support of a Motion to Dismiss only challenges 
the government’s use of a UAV on the basis that UAVs are not currently 
available for general public use.189  As UAVs are strongly analogous to other 
aircrafts and the aerial surveillance likely took place from navigable airspace, 
the Brossart court correctly denied the Brossarts’ motion to dismiss.190 
III.  BROSSART HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE IMPENDING WIDESPREAD DOMESTIC UAV USE 
A close analysis of the Brossart facts reveals that the case was properly 
decided under existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  However, Brossart 
also highlights how the imminent expansion of the use of UAVs on civilians in 
the United States presents a challenge to current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.191  The use of UAVs will require that both the courts and 
 183. See id. (noting that there is not a specific time where monitoring becomes unreasonable, 
though four weeks was in Jones, and acknowledging that another case could “present more difficult 
questions”). 
 184. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4–5. 
 185. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 186. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20. 
 187. See State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 
2012). 
 188. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
180 (1984). 
 189. See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20. 
 190. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text. 
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Congress properly balance the government’s desire to use a powerful  
law-enforcement tool with privacy protections for individuals.192 
This challenge was foreshadowed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion 
in United States v. Jones.193  Like the GPS technology used in Jones, UAVs 
allow the Government to inexpensively monitor a person’s every movement, and 
to “ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits and so on.”194  Such extensive surveillance certainly has the capacity to 
chill “associational and expressive freedoms.”195  Yet, so long as such 
monitoring occurs in open fields, or, in most cases, in the curtilage of the home, 
current Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence will not protect individuals in  
circumstances similar to Mr. Brossart.196 
In Jones, Justice Alito suggests that legislation is the most effective way to 
balance privacy and public safety concerns related to the government’s use of 
devices that allow for long-term monitoring of individuals.197  Now that 
Congress has authorized an increased use of UAVs for civilian purposes, it 
should also enact measures that give the government the ability to use this 
powerful law-enforcement tool, while safeguarding the public’s privacy.198 
Current legislative initiatives suggest that there is a bipartisan push for 
legislation to balance the government’s use of UAVs with the public’s privacy 
concerns.199  Three bills aiming to protect the public’s privacy from increased 
use of UAVs for civilian government purposes were introduced in the 112th 
Congress.200  However, these bills have been criticized as overly broad in 
protecting privacy and severely limiting the government’s ability to use 
 192. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090 (noting the potential privacy concerns of widespread 
UAV use and the need for legislative action). 
 193. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
 194. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), mandamus denied 
sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Scholars have pointed to this language as 
supporting the adoption of the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment.  See supra note 108. 
 195. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956. 
 196. See supra Part II.C. 
 197. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 198. Congressional action to regulate the use of emerging practices and technologies for 
privacy purposes has firm precedents.  See id. at 962–63 (discussing legislation passed to deal with 
Fourth Amendment questions related to wiretapping). 
 199. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090, 2092–93 (discussing bipartisan legislative action to 
address the privacy concerns related to UAVs); see also Associated Press, supra note 125 (noting 
that concerns over the civil-liberty issues raised by the use of UAVs has led to bipartisan 
discussions of UAV legislation). 
 200. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18–19.  The bills include the Preserving Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012 (H.R. 5925, S. 3287), the Preserving American Privacy Act 
of 2012 (H.R. 6199), and the Farmers’ Privacy Act of 2012 (H.R. 5961).  Id.  Concerns over the 
potential dangers the government’s domestic use of UAVs have also been raised in the new 113th 
Congress, leading to a thirteen-hour filibuster seeking to block the Senate’s approval of the 
President’s nominee to lead the CIA.  See Ed O’Keefe and Aaron Blake, Senator Holds Long 
Fillibuster to Oppose Obama’s Drone Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A2. 
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UAVs.201  For example, the Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 would 
only permit UAV use by law enforcement “except pursuant to [a] warrant and 
in the investigation of a felony” and excludes all evidence obtained in violation 
of the Act from criminal proceedings.202  This approach may prevent law 
enforcement from operating UAVs in open fields for securing large-crowd 
events or enforcing traffic laws, both of which are permitted under current 
jurisprudence.  The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 
2012 takes a more nuanced approach, prohibiting the warrantless use of a UAV 
to collect evidence regarding criminal conduct or a violation of a regulation, but 
specifically allowing UAVs to be used to patrol the border, to prevent imminent 
danger to life, and to manage situation with high risks of terrorist attacks.203  Yet, 
this proposed Act is overly restrictive because it prevents law enforcement from 
using UAVs in open fields.204 
Instead, Congress should find a way to allow law enforcement to use this 
valuable tool in all necessary circumstances, while also taking into consideration 
Fourth Amendment rights.205  To accomplish this, Congress should aim to 
clarify how current principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence apply to 
UAVs and add additional privacy protections that account for their unique 
capabilities.206  Following current Fourth Amendment principles, stronger 
privacy protections should be applied to criminal and regulatory investigations 
and more liberal rules applied to non-invasive uses, such as locating lost persons 
or assessing damages from natural disasters.207  Similarly, Congress should 
codify the Fourth Amendment’s strong protection of the home by requiring that 
a warrant be issued before the government can use UAV-mounted technologies 
 201. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2095–96 (noting that some members of Congress, local 
government officials, and UAV industry representatives have expressed concerns that an over-
regulation of privacy concerns may stifle the industry’s growth and prevent the government from 
using UAVs for desirable purposes); Tim Adelman, Flurry of ‘Drone’ Bills’ Shows Congress Has 
Much to Learn, THE HILL (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/foreign-policy/250597-flurry-of-drone-bills-shows-congress-has-much-to-learn (arguing that 
Congress is right to consider privacy protection measures as UAV technology becomes widely 
used, but that such measures should not excessively limit the government’s use of UAV’s). 
 202. H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2012). 
 203. S. 3287, 112th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2012); H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2012). 
 204. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18 (showing there is no open fields exception under 
either form of the bill). 
 205. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2095 (noting the importance of legislation that does not 
overly restrict UAV use). 
 206. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18 (discussing legislation that has restricted 
government surveillance tools further than the court, and suggesting Congress do the same with 
UAVs). 
 207. Jones suggests that the latter category would not constitute a search, as “mere visual 
observation does not constitute a search.”  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012), 
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Tim Adelman argues that 
the use of UAVs to find lost hikers, survey multi-car crashes, and other similar activities are 
government uses of drones that do not intrude on privacy and should not be discouraged.  Adelman, 
supra note 201. 
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to conduct surveillance revealing information about the interior of the home.208  
To address privacy concerns of long-term UAV surveillance, Congress should 
permit surveillance of spaces falling within the open fields doctrine, but place a 
time limit on aerial surveillance preventing the government from conducting 
long-term investigations of individuals without prior judicial approval.209  
Lastly, Congressional action should also aim to limit unwanted invasions of 
privacy by private citizens, which falls outside of the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.210 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As the use of UAVs domestically becomes significantly more widespread, 
many have expressed concerns about capacity of current Fourth Amendment 
search jurisprudence’s to effectively manage both privacy rights and law 
enforcement’s use of this new and powerful tool.  As one of the first cases in the 
United States in which a UAV was used, State v. Brossart has become a symbol 
of the anxiety brought on by domestic use of UAVs.  Nonetheless, the Brossart 
facts do not pose new questions of law.  But, the case highlights some of the 
weaknesses of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on searches, 
particularly as to how courts handle new technologies.  It also serves as a call to 
both the courts and legislators to more clearly define the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections in light of emerging technologies. 
 
  
 208. See supra Part I A.4 (highlighting the Court’s strong protection of the home). 
 209. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 210. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5 (4th ed. 
2011) (explaining that the Constitution’s protection of civil liberties “appl[ies] only to the 
government; private conduct generally does not have to comply with the Constitution”).  Section 5 
of The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 forbids federal agencies from permitting private 
entities from monitoring an individual “without the consent of that other private person or the owner 
of any real property on which that other private person is present.”  H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. §5 
(2012). 
                     
496 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:465 
 
